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The legacy of Hugo Chávez has lessons for how the EU and its
institutions can engage with populist leaders.
by Blog Admin
What can the rise and success of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez tell us about populism? Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser takes an in-depth look at the lessons the EU’s leaders can draw from
Chávez to deal with the recent rise of populist movements in Europe. He argues that
opponents to populism must understand that populists are not only representing real
constituencies of society, but that opposition to them can be a source of further reinforcement
and radicalisation.
With the death of  Hugo Chávez at the beginning of  March, the battle f or the interpretation
of  his legacy has begun. On the one hand, his f ollowers will spare no ef f ort in depicting him not only as
Venezuela’s saviour, but also as a role model f or the lef t in Latin America and elsewhere. On the other
hand, his detractors will portray him as an authoritarian leader, who was able to win elections thanks to the
development of  extensive networks of  clientelism and the closure of  independent media.
Given that there is some truth in each of  these interpretations, the question about the legacy of  Hugo
Chávez will most probably involve a heated debate. Any discussion about the socio-economic and socio-
polit ical heritage of  Chávez’s government should try to put the f igure of  Hugo Chávez into context. To do
this, it is crucial to analyse the polit ical evolution that he experienced f rom his coming to power in 1999 to
his death in 2013: something which the EU’s governments and institutions would do well to examine as they
f ace the rise of  populists such as Hungary’s Victor Orbaán, and Italy’s Beppe Grillo.
Like most countries of  the Andean
region, Venezuela experienced a
serious crisis of  democratic
representation during the 1990s. Many
reasons have been given f or this,
including insuf f icient economic growth,
rising poverty, increasing income
inequality, and last but not least,
corruption. The ‘success’ of
Venezuelan democracy f rom the 1960s
to the 1980s relied on the
consolidation of  a two-party system,
which in the long run ended up
cementing the power of  a cartel of
elites that was much more interested
in preserving its own interests and
wealth than in economic redistribution
and in improving the quality of  the democratic regime. When Hugo Chávez organised a coup d’état in 1992,
he was mounting a rebellion against this cartel of  elites, which was seen as highly illegit imate by a majority
of  the Venezuelan population.Af ter his release f rom jail in 1994, Chávez travelled across the country and
started to build a loose network of  sympathisers, intellectuals and polit ical activists. With their help, he was
able to construct a polit ical platf orm centred on a simple but powerf ul message: ‘The people of  our country
have been robbed of  their rightf ul sovereignty by a corrupt establishment! The time has come to rise up
and regain it ’. This populist message proved to be the key to his electoral success. Otherwise stated, the
coming into power of  Chávez was not only related to his charisma, but also – and mainly – to the f act that
large sections of  the Venezuelan population had and continue to have emotional and rational motives f or
adhering to the Manichean distinction between ‘the people versus the elite’ inherent to populism.
Oddly enough, many analysts f orget that when Chávez won the presidential elections in 1998, his populist
discourse neither contained ref erences to anti-neoliberalism, nor radical socialism. Instead, the role model
that he had in mind was that of  UK Prime Minister Tony Blair ’s ‘Third Way’. Chávez wanted to rebuild the
economy by f inding a new balance between the state and the f ree market. How can we explain that his
government departed f rom the idea of  the Third Way and moved towards the ideology of  the so-called
‘Socialism of  the 21st century’? Three drivers of  radicalisation help to answer this question.
First, given that Chávez did not have a polit ical party behind him, the main basis of  support f or his regime
relied on the mobilisation of  grassroots constituencies. The latter were mainly poor people, who prof ited
f rom the social policies that Chávez began to implement once he came to power. Assisted by the strong
rise in the international oil price, Chávez was indeed able to implement a broad array of  social policies that
contributed to organise the grassroots level as a polit ical counterweight to entrenched power structures.
There was a polit ical logic behind the social policies implemented by Chávez: the more poor constituencies
backed the regime, the easier it was to mobilise them to push f or the realisation of  ref orms that could
reduce the power of  the cartel of  elites, which had dominated Venezuelan polit ics in the recent past. 
Second, although there was no consensus within the opposition regarding how to deal with Chávez coming
to power, radical f actions predominated and advocated dif f erent strategies that sought to destabilise the
regime. Two of  these strategies are worth mentioning: the support f or the coup attempt against Chávez in
2002, and the organisation of  not only a general strike, but also a takeover of  the state-owned oil
company PDVSA in 2003. Both strategies were extremely counterproductive. While the coup d’état f ailed
and led to a purge of  the armed f orces, the general strike and takeover of  PDVSA paved the way f or a
massive replacement of  oil sector workers with loyalist supporters.
Third, with the election of  President George W. Bush in 2000, the relations between the US and Venezuela
suf f ered an abrupt deterioration. In f act, f ew question that President Bush’s administration was involved in
the coup attempt against Chávez in 2002. Furthermore, when Venezuela’s regime was depicted as part of
the so-called ‘axis of  evil’, Chávez had a f ruitf ul opportunity to portray his polit ical project as the battle of
David against Goliath. The f ormation of  a ‘Chavista’ diplomacy interested in f ostering the coming into
power of  lef t ist populist f orces across Latin America was theref ore directly related to the way in which the
United States dealt with Chávez. Chávez’s f amous 2006 speech at the United Nations general assembly, in
which he described George W. Bush as the incarnation of  the devil, must be understood against this
background. The rest of  the story is well-known. The more Chávez was attacked, f rom inside the country
and f rom outside, the more radical his populist discourse became. In addition, he used the oil economy to
give money and dignity not only to the poor in Venezuela, but also to international actors who were in
f avour of  his polit ical approach.
What lessons can be drawn f rom this f or the analysis of  populism in general? First and f oremost, the
polit ical evolution of  Chávez reveals that the radicalisation of  a populist movement is closely linked to the
behaviour of  its opponents. Just as the pejorative response of  many liberal elites has nurtured the
extremist rhetoric of  the populist Tea Party movement in the U.S., the undemocratic means used by sectors
of  the old Venezuelan establishment and the government of  George W. Bush to f ight against Chávez were
anything but benef icial. This is not a trivial point. Many well- intentioned activists and scholars tend to f orget
that the rise of  populist f orces has less to do with the emergence of  a charismatic snake charmer, and
more to do with social grievances that make the populist discourse appealing to large sectors of  the
population. Strategies seeking to deal with populism that do not put the populist f orces into context are
destined to f ail.
Secondly, and related to the previous point, activists and scholars should be very caref ul when it comes to
promoting policies regarding how to cope with populist f orces. Whether we like it or not, populist leaders
and parties do represent certain constituencies and sometimes they are able to obtain an important
amount of  votes. As a consequence, we should acknowledge not only that the claims made by populist
f orces have a certain degree of  legit imacy, but also that more of ten than not those who vote f or populist
leaders and parties have sensible reasons f or doing this. As a matter of  f act, bef ore the rise of  populist
radical parties in Europe, many mainstream parties spared litt le ef f ort in thinking about immigration,
although this topic is seen as an important problem f or a signif icant part of  the population. At the same
time, those who f eel represented by the Five Star Movement in Italy, and other European populist f orces in
the making, have good reasons f or being f ed up with the polit ical establishment.
Third and f inally, the rise and f all of  Hugo Chávez reveals that international institutions are particularly ill-
prepared f or coping with populism. This applies to the Organization of  American States  as much as to the
European Union, which has increasing problems dealing with Eastern European governments that are
controlled by populist f orces (such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Hungary). As Jan-Werner Müller has
indicated in a recent working paper, it is now a matter of  urgency to rethink the toolkit that national
governments and international institutions should advance to protect liberal democracy f rom populists- in-
power, whose actions can lead to deteriorations in the rule of  law, and thus a process of  de-
democratisation.
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